The Changing Face of Airmanship and Safety Culture Operating Unmanned Aircraft Systems by Lamb, Tracy
Student Works 
5-2019 
The Changing Face of Airmanship and Safety Culture Operating 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
Tracy Lamb 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, LAMBT4@my.erau.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/student-works 
 Part of the Aeronautical Vehicles Commons, and the Aviation Safety and Security Commons 
Scholarly Commons Citation 
Lamb, T. (2019). The Changing Face of Airmanship and Safety Culture Operating Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Civilian Logistics and Supply Chain Management, (). 
https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-5225-7900-7.ch009 
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Student Works by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please 
contact commons@erau.edu. 
Copyright © 2019, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.
Chapter  9
243
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-5225-7900-7.ch009
ABSTRACT
The notion of using drones for commercial purposes has evolved in the past 5 years 
from the initial “boom” of excitement around this, somewhat of a novelty and 
curiosity, to more calculated and sophisticated use of unmanned aircraft systems 
(UAS), or drones. In the hands of true professionals, drones can offer highly efficient 
and profitable solutions for industrial, and commercial inspections and other data 
capturing tasks. The appetite for safe and efficient collection of data is a changing 
face of safety cultures and how teams and individuals apply airmanship principles, 
and how inspection crew and UAS crew interact. UAS are no longer viewed as novelty 
or useful addition to the inspectors’ “toolbox,” but as an integrated part of safety 
critical system. While there is much to be learned from tradition manned aviation, 
UAS pilots are confronted with different task priorities in order to effectively “aviate,” 
and therefore, like the changing face of airmanship and safety culture, to “aviate” 
emerges has having different attributes when compared to manned aviation.
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THE COMMERCIAL DRONE BOOM OF 2013-
2018: ITS VICTORIES AND CHALLENGES
Much of the small commercial Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) industry emerged 
out of the industrial inspection, information technology, photogrammetric survey, 
‘big data’, and technical industry. However, some had their origins in the hobby and 
‘modellers’ area. The emerging applications of small commercial UAS started to 
increase in prevalence in the public media following Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA)’s approval of first commercial UAS flights over land in 2014 (FAA, 2014). 
The novel use of UAS has rapidly advanced to a variety of industry sectors around 
the world, and today, in 2018, the FAA has just recorded over 600,000 commercial 
UAS operators licensed under Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 107, in the 
United States alone (Elwell, 2017).
Back in 2013, as awareness increased about the innovative uses, and benefits of 
using small UAS in practical applications, the commercial organizations became 
highly motivated to focus their attention on learning and capturing this novel and 
cost-effective way to bring value to their customers, to capture images of their 
assets, and more importantly, not to miss out on what appeared to be a competitive 
edge. The Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI)’s 
economic report of 2013 predicted that the small commercial UAS industry would 
be cumulatively worth USD 1.8 billion, between 2015-2015 (Jenkins & Vasigh, 
2013). Today, in 2018, we recognize that those predictions were not conservative, 
considering the latest studies (e.g., Grand View Research, 2016) indicate that the 
small commercial UAS industry is expected to reach USD 2.07 billion by 2022.
In many cases prior to 2017, the procurement of small commercial UAS or ‘drone’ 
was not formal management or organisational decision, the C-suite was generally 
not informed of the acquisition of the ‘drone’, as it was viewed as another relatively 
low cost ‘tool’ or solution for day-to-day operations.
Specialised inspection personnel who recognized the value in the data collection 
ability viewed the UAS as something that would add value a capability to their tool 
box, usually after learning and reading about the latest technological advancements 
through blogs, social media, technical papers, and other industry peers to achieve 
efficient and effective completion of allocated tasks (Lamb, 2017).
The rapid advancement of UAS technology, including supportive platforms, 
software, First Person View (FPV), and other gadgets to improve performance, quickly 
became the focus of technical discussions and field stories1, among the professional 
community of inspectors. For these professionals, working in industries that rely 
on data monitoring and imagery to determine the condition of their high-value 
infrastructure and physical assets such as oil, gas, mining, utilities, rail and road. 
For these organizations and their stakeholders, the return on investment in utilizing 
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the UAS was obvious. However, the benefits of using this new technology came 
with follow-on implications and considerations that were yet to be discovered. Some 
of the questions that needed to be addressed relating to topics include: Standards, 
certification, training, liability, safety and risk management integration. In the absence 
of formal processes, protocols, regulations and standards for this new industry, 
organizations did their best by improvising what was required (Lamb, 2017).
Even today, in 2018, the small commercial drone industry presents a relatively low 
barrier to entry as UAS platforms are considerably less expensive than a conventional 
commercial aircraft in terms of initial capital investment and the operating costs. 
Also, the qualifications and approvals required to pilot a small commercial UAS 
are easy to obtain. In the United States, there are currently no pilot competency 
assessments required to gain a small commercial UAS license under Federal Aviation 
Regulation (FAR) Part 107 (FAA, 2018b).
This low barrier to entry makes it an attractive opportunity for organizations to 
gain the benefits of UAS. In terms of the diversity in UAS’s design, capabilities and 
their applications, this has led to the dynamic growth in the ubiquitous utilization 
of UAS (e.g., Palmer & Clothier, 2013; Weibel & Hansman, 2005)
It is not only the United States that is experiencing this tremendous adoption 
of UAS into the commercial industry. According to Statista (2018), the estimated 
spending on UAS in US Dollars for financial years between 2017 and 2021 in the 
top five countries are:
• 17.5 Billion in the United States;
• 4.5 Billion in China;
• 3.9 Billion in Russia;
• 3.5 Billion in the United Kingdom; and,
• 3.1 Billion in Australia
While both the evolution and proliferation of commercial Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (UAVs) is evident there are growing concerns with their use. These concerns 
include, but not limited to, the combination of lack of training in the operations 
and technical expertise such as; understanding the control interface complexities, 
data processing, programming, security issues with transferring and storing and 
interpretation, and being able to meet the client expectations or requirements from 
that data. More importantly, having in-depth understandings of the safety and 
operational requirements of complex environments owned by the client’s industry 
(e.g., mine site, off-shore rig, chemical plant, cell tower, wind turbine, complex 
power network) are all key considerations for the success of a UAS service provider.
The majority of the small commercial UAS platforms used today have some basic 
safety mechanisms embedded within their systems to facilitate the operators to use 
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the UAS safely, such a return to land function, or an altitude limiter. However, these 
safety mechanisms are not required by legislation or standardized by any manufacturer, 
and frequently not fully understood by the operators (Plioutsias, Karanikas, & 
Chatzimihildidou, 2018). With the release of the FAA Reauthorization, Bill 302, in 
October 2018, there are provisions within this that direct small UAS to be equipped 
with some of the components that support the safety of flight capabilities as part of 
the certification process (USA Congress, 2018).
With no provision for remote pilot flight competency, training or assessment 
provided within legislation, a well-balanced and harmonised merger of safety cultures 
and safety behaviours remain challenges for both the operator and the organisation. 
Despite this, most small commercial UAS platforms promote the benefits of using 
‘off the shelf’ equipment, such as an iPad or computer as they are “easy to use”. 
However, the human-induced errors or ‘human factors’ remain a major contributor 
to small UAS mishaps and safety incidents (Lamb, 2018).
The use of an iPad, iPhone or other familiar devices such as a laptop computer 
should support UAS operations by providing a familiar platform, however; safety 
incidences involving small drones is increasing (Flatley, 2017). The propensity for 
human errors increases in complex activities, especially when interacting with new 
and complex technology such as the interaction required to operate a drone remotely 
from a computer, iPad or control station (Mouloua, Gilson, Kring, & Hancock, 2001).
This industry challenge is further exacerbated by the fact that there are currently 
no requirements for flight competency assessments within the regulatory framework. 
Neil and Griffin (2002) argued that leadership is a critical driver to have a positive 
impact on safety behaviors in terms of safety compliance and safety participation, 
at this juncture, there is no leadership in the industry on competency-based training 
standards or regulatory flight assessment standards. This has a twofold effect 
where the former refers to individuals performing core activities while maintaining 
workplace safety while the latter refers to individuals developing an environment 
that supports safety (Neil & Griffin, 2002). Therefore; safety leadership must be 
driven and supported by the leaders in the UAS industry and organizations who 
support the use of UAS in their day-to-day operations, must support, champion and 
drive a proactive safety culture that integrates drones (Helmerich & Merritt, 2001).
THE CHALLENGES OF INTEGRATING SAFETY 
CULTURES AND MERGING NEW TECHNOLOGIES
Despite the considerable benefits in utilising UAS, there are significant integration 
factors that must be considered when using UAS in commercial applications. Research 
(e.g., Gawron, 1998, as cited in McCarley & Wickens, 2006), has found that having 
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the human separated from machine produces different human performance and risk 
factors that attract a multitude of potential hazards when compared to conventional 
aviation. However, there are considerable challenges from the human integration 
perspective as well as the introduction of small commercial UAS as a cultural 
shift, both at the organizational level and the personal safety level was postulated 
(Helmerich & Merritt, 2001; Lamb, 2017).
Another part of the challenge is recognising the falsehood of the inaccurate 
aggregate risk value, promulgated by the ‘probability’ factor, that potential hazards 
associated with small commercial UAS are viewed as ‘low risk’, because chances of 
the UAS causing major damage or loss is low. This perception is largely due to the 
weakness in the use of the standard Risk Assessment Matrix although the standard 
risk matrix is widely used and highly promoted and recommended by aviation 
regulators worldwide (ICAO, 2012).
Two main limitations of the standard risk matrix; the first lies within the human 
factor realm, this limitation is subjectivity, especially when assessing the ‘Low 
Probability’ (LP), and ‘High Consequence’ (HC), risks (Robinsons & Francis, 
2014). The second; the specialized training, or lack thereof, provided to the front-
line staff who use this commonly applied tool (Peace, 2017). Most users of the risk 
matrix estimate the probability factor of a catastrophic event caused by the UAS 
being extremely rare (total risk value = probability x consequence). This is an 
estimation based on the subjective perspective or frame of reference to the safety 
representative of the operation.
While the aviation regulators direct operators to consider residual risks and 
support safety assurance (closed loop systems), the risk matrix as a standalone tool 
does not direct, or remind the operator to report back into their system or consider 
additional or residual risks, or confirm the accuracy of their initial aggregate risk 
values. Therefore; the risk matrix itself as a tool “…when used with front line staff, 
who are not properly trained, performs like an open loop system” (Stolzer, Halford, 
& Goglia, 2013, pp. 156-168). Therefore, small commercial UAS operators often 
miss this critical function that is implied but not indicated on a standard risk matrix.
Research has shown that mishap rates involving UAS are up to 300 times greater 
than that of conventionally piloted aircraft fleets in general aviation (Carrigan, 
Long, Cummings, & Duffner, 2008) and UAS operations in military is no exception 
(Williams, 2004), which is surprising if you consider the amount of training that 
military crew receive compared to that of small commercial UAS pilots. Therefore, 
this trend of ubiquitous mishap rates should be further investigated given the 
unprecedented growth in the utilisation of UAS across many industries.
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It is not only private commercial organizations that have become captivated 
by this emerging UAS technology, government and public safety agencies began 
embracing the potential benefits of using drones as early as 2005 when drones were 
used to search for survivors of Hurricane Katrina (NSF, n.d.). Implementation and 
coordination of UAS in public safety are now viewed as a matter of paramount 
urgency given the increases in natural event occurrences such as flooding, fire and 
severe storms. The national emergencies in the USA associated with hurricanes and 
floods in 2017 and 2018 increased the use of designated public safety UAS to an 
all-time high with the FAA issuing over 300 special flight permits called ‘waivers’, 
in response to the demand for UAS search and rescue capabilities, and has since 
issued over 2500 waivers (Figure 1) to commercial UAS operators (FAA, 2018b).
Humans play a vital and centric role in UAS operations. Research has indicated 
that this role is more complex than conventional aviation and safety critical activities 
such as commercial infrastructure inspections, testing and data collection. For 
instance, McCarley and Wickens (2004) identified that an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
(UAV) operator performed duties “in relative sensory isolation” due to the absence of 
various sensory cues such as vestibular input and ambient noise (p. 1). As the UAS 
industry is growing exponentially and UAS operators have become more prevalent 
in commercial aerospace, safety behaviours, safety culture and the concept of being 
able to ‘Aviate’ are evolving.
Figure 1. Waiver types granted to operators
Adapted from AUVSI, 2018. (https://www.auvsi.org/our-impact/waivers-under-part-107-interactive-
report)
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To ‘Aviate’: We Used to Know What That Meant
According to Oxford dictionary (2018), ‘Aviate’, is defined as “to pilot or fly an 
aircraft”. Similarly, the FAA defines ‘Aviate’ as ‘maintaining control of the aircraft’ 
(FAA, 2018a; Hobbs & Lyall, 2016). Based on currently accepted aviation and 
general definitions to a pilot, ‘Aviate’ refers to pilots’ priority to ‘fly the aircraft’ and 
this specifically addresses the pilots’ performance tasks of maintaining control and 
keeping the aircraft in a safe state prior to addressing other tasks of navigating or 
communicating. Many pilots recite this commonly used phrase; “Aviate, Navigate, 
Communicate” (A-N-C), as a reminder of priorities the pilot-in-command follows 
particularly in an emergency or non-normal situation.
1.  Aviate: Maintain control of the aircraft
2.  Navigate: Know where you are and where you intend to go
3.  Communicate: Let someone know your plans and needs
It may be assumed that the common definition of ‘maintaining control of the 
aircraft’ could easily be transferred to the unmanned aircraft system, except that the 
techniques and modes of how that is achieved are radically different to a conventionally 
manned aircraft. In a UAS operation, operators are required to consider numerous 
factors including; command control (C2 Link)2 latency, or interruptions, limited 
ability to “see and avoid”, absence of sensory feedback of aircraft state, and control 
station configuration that may not relate to conventional pilot task actions. All of 
these factors directly or indirectly affect the task of controlling the aircraft and 
maintaining it in a stable powered state.
According to a NASA report (Hobbs & Lyall, 2016), most current designs of 
advanced Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) rely entirely on automated systems 
for basic flight control and they do not provide options for pilot manual control. 
Instead, the remote pilot is responsible for supervisory control of the automation. 
Consequently, manual flight control becomes less of an issue for the remote pilot 
making automation management issues of critical importance. However, unmanned 
aircraft systems present unique challenges to effective Human System Integration 
(HIS), and the various levels of automation may affect the pilot of a remotely piloted 
aircraft’s ability to control the aircraft on certain tasks. Some aircraft systems are 
on the higher level of automation, to the extent that they approach ‘autonomous’, 
the level at which the pilot is excluded from determining and actioning the task, 
effectively removing and/or limiting the pilot from some of the flight process 
(Parasuraman & Wickens, 2008).
A pilot of a conventional aircraft can lose almost all on board functions (navigation, 
communication, even flight control and propulsion) and the pilot may still be able 
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to ‘Aviate’ or control the aircraft to a safe or safer outcome than a crash (examples 
include ‘Captain Sully Sullenberger landing his crippled Airbus on the Hudson 
River, the Glimi Glider). Not having those human minds on board the aircraft 
presents challenges. Clearly, there is a barrier, an interface that sometimes does not 
support the indirect control ‘connections’ of the system, as witnessed in examples 
of this in a high percentage of human factors in remotely piloted aircraft incidents 
(Tvaryanas, Thompson, & Constable, 2006). Remote pilots’ ability to continue to 
perform the traditional tasks designated as ‘Aviate’ may be completely removed due 
to the failure of the C2 link. Depending on the level of automation, this may occur 
at a much lower threshold in some UAS platforms, compared to others.
For instance, a complete C2 link failure may remove the operators’ ability to 
Aviate, navigate and communicate all at once, even though the aircraft may continue 
to maintain stable powered flight. This is referred to as the ‘lost link flight profile’ 
where the aircraft flies for a pre-determined time on predetermined programmed 
flight planning inputs. In this situation, operators are expected to organise backup or 
alternatives systems or ‘capture’ methods. Alternatively, the operators may orchestrate 
the emergency procedures. These potential actions do not fit to a conventional 
definition of ‘Aviate’. Therefore, if the term ‘Aviate’ is to be used in the context of 
he remote pilot in control, being responsible for controlling the unmanned aircraft, 
it must be clear on both its definition and contextual elements to ensure that the 
correct meaning and intent is incorporated appropriately and accurately in ICAO 
documents, with a particular focus on new proposed Standards And Recommended 
Practices (SARPs) for RPAS operations. This is a topic that is currently being 
discussed among industry experts.
From Figure 2, you may notice that when controlling the aircraft sensory and 
perception differences have an influence, and there are also environmental and 
network quality and latency that may also affect the pilot’s ability to Aviate effectively 
in the traditional sense. The Pilot’s commands and the aircraft messages relayed 
back to the control station may suffer degraded C2 influences; variable lengths of 
time delay (latency); distortion, interference, switching faults or failure. Any one of 
these faults with the C2 link will affect a pilot’s response time and effective control.
There has been research to explore the issues of the pilot’s ability to Aviate at 
differing levels of automation. An illustration of how the different automated tasks 
affect a pilot’s ability to Aviate is presented in Figure 3 (Hobbs & Lyall, 2016). This 
figure provides a model of the unique pilot performance tasks that are required to 
maintain or regain control of the UAS. This high-level model of the responsibilities 
of the remote pilot, consistent with FAA assumptions, adapted from Mutuel, Wargo 
and DiFelici (2015).
In addition to varying levels of automation, the layout and displays of the control 
stations can differ greatly that results in the presentation of ergonomic and cognitive 
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Figure 2. ICAO RPAS Panel Concept of Operations. The blue indicates the remote 
pilot activity of Aviate
(Diagram reproduced courtesy of ICAO)
Figure 3. Responsibilities of remote pilots when operating RPAS
Source: adapted from Hobbs and Lyall (2016, p. 18).
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challenges for the remote pilot. A pilot of a conventional aircraft can lose almost all 
on board functions; navigation, communication, even flight control and propulsion, 
and may still be able to control the aircraft to a safe or safer outcome than a crash. 
Examples of the human’s ability to Aviate include; ‘Capt Sully Sullenberger who 
controlled his Airbus when both engines failed, on the Hudson River New York City.
With UAS becoming increasingly automated and as we move towards some 
components of the UAS utilizing machine learning algorithms, deterministic and 
non-deterministic [autonomous] neural networks, one must question, the boundaries 
that define human’s ability to Aviate and the capability for human resilience to be 
replaced. It is a complex question with deep implications, who is responsible for what?
The ability to safely pilot an aircraft remotely is the foundational premise of 
the ICAO’s, Remotely Piloted Aircraft, Concept of Operations document. This 
document is the operational reference that the RPAS panel follows to develop the 
SARPs that will evenly be codified into legislation by the 192 contracting states 
[countries] who are under the ‘Chicago Convention’. At present, with regards to 
piloting the aircraft safely, it is mentioned throughout the document and continually 
referred to in the current ‘draft SARPs’ due to be incorporated into state legislation 
by 2023. The SARPs have been written with the directive assumption (assumption 
8), that ‘the remote pilot must be competent, licensed and capable to discharge the 
responsibility for safe flight’.3
There are also implications on the safety assurance processes connected to safety 
flying the RPAS to mitigate undesirable events such as mid-air collisions or injury 
to people and damage to property on the ground4. Section; 2.6.2 of the ICAO RPAS 
CONOPS states that all system designs must ensure that the responsibility and liability 
for safe operation are retained by the operator and their flight crew (ICAO, 2017). 
Remote pilots must be able to override or modify automated functions, except where 
such actions cannot be executed safely due to the immediacy of the situation (e.g., an 
imminent collision avoidance manoeuvre) or where task complexity makes human 
intervention unreasonable. This guiding principal indicates a clear responsibility of 
the remote pilot to be able to firstly safety operate the aircraft, the word operates, and 
fly is used interchangeably in the context of controlling the aircraft. The CONOPS 
section 4.5.3 mentions in-flight handover between Remote Pilot Stations (RPS) 
that there are considerations during handovers that need clarifications as to what 
constitutes the remote pilot in commands ability and obligation to Aviate (ICAO, 
2017). The section states; ‘In either case, the safe and effective handover of piloting 
control from one station to another must be assured’.5
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Safety Culture and the Challenges for UAS Operators
Turner, Pidgeon, Blockley and Toft (1989) defined safety culture as “the set of beliefs, 
norms, attitudes, roles, and social and technical practices within an organisation 
which is concerned with minimising exposure of employees, managers, customers, 
suppliers and members of the general public to conditions considered to be dangerous 
or injurious” (p. 4). Simply put, it is a type of relationship that an organisation has 
with safety (Helmreich, 1998; Helmerich & Merritt, 2001).
The concepts of safety culture highlight a dynamic and multifaceted nature 
of humans and their behaviour, especially within the workplace or organization 
framework. Safety-related behaviour includes, but is not limited to, dynamic 
interfaces between psychological and organisational factors within the organisation, 
and occurs at different levels, from the individual to the collective, and pervading 
from top management. It has been described that safety culture as a composite and 
dynamic term, wherein the two components, safety and culture, can be defined 
independently depending on individual perspective. In reality, safety culture is a 
dynamic configuration of factors interacting on multiple levels within an organisation 
that influence and measurably determine total safety performance (Helmreich, 1998; 
Reason, 1990) The safety culture of an organization will directly impact safety 
performance of the organization.
The term safety culture first appeared in a report in the aftermath of the 1986 
Chernobyl disaster (Cooper, 2000), where the errors and violations of operating 
procedures that contributed to the accident were identified by some experts as being 
evidence of a ‘poor safety culture’, (Salas & Maurino, 2010, p. 97). Historically, 
safety culture has been developed as a result of incidents and accidents. This is what 
is described as a reactive safety culture’ (ICAO, 2012) whereby past accidents and 
mishaps escalated the evolution of safety policy and practices. Research findings 
(e.g., Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2013; Helmreich & Merritt, 2001; Helmreich, 
1988) suggested the importance of having, at the very least, a ‘proactive’ approach 
of safety management. From there, drive towards a predictive approach to safety, 
involving not just studying past statistics but shaping safety behaviours of the people 
within the system through developing, adopting and improving the safety policies, 
procedures and values over time.
Bethune and Huler (1998) added to this concept of safety culture stating that it could 
take organisations up to 10 years to achieve notable positive changes in behaviours. 
Hudson (2001) expanded that it was necessary to further develop organisational 
cultures that supported higher processes such as ‘thinking the unthinkable’ and 
being intrinsically motivated to be safe even when there seemed no obvious reason 
to do this. If having a strong positive, predictive safety culture takes a long time 
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to evolve, where does that leave the exponentially growing vulnerable commercial 
UAS industry?
Safety culture is not an abstract concept. Components of safety culture can be 
developed, implemented and improved upon and thus, it is often termed a part of 
a ‘living system’. Cooper (2000) added that the establishment and enhancement 
of a safety culture relied on the deliberate and targeted manipulation of various 
organisational characteristics potentially impacting safety management practices. 
Alternatively, safety culture can start, for instance, with one committed individual and 
filter through the whole organisation as it can and has been used as a motivating tool 
for the organisation, ultimately leading to achieving its safety goals. It is recognized 
that the most influential individual to drive an organization’s safety culture is the 
top-level management, an accountable executive, who is usually the Chief Operating 
Officer (CEO) of the organization (ICAO, 2012).
Organizations that engage in safety critical activities are often called ‘High-
Reliability Organisations’ (HROs) (Helmerich & Merritt, 2001; Reason, 1990). 
Examples of HROs’ are: nuclear power plants, industrial installations, offshore 
installations, mine sites, rail organisations, wind farms, aviation and aerospace 
organisations, and medical facilities such as the emergency departments in hospitals.
HROs are acutely aware of and pay particular attention to their safety cultures 
as safety culture is a lead indication of safety performance (Helmreich & Merritt, 
2001). As the benefits of using UAS are becoming widely accepted, commercial 
UAS operations are integrated with these HRO industries, and therefore; bring 
‘outside’ influences into the established HRO safety culture (Lamb, 2017). Companies 
that achieve safety and efficiency in HROs share a common practice. Their safety 
systems and protocols are the critical focus, forming an integral part of ‘how they 
do business’, in order to ensure a safe, efficient, healthy and productive workplace. 
Generally, HROs are highly dependent and technology centric, including software, 
data analytics, navigation technology and new composite hardware such as robotics 
and now, with the increase in small UAS platform, readily available ‘Off The Shelf 
Solutions’ (OTSS).
Once an organisation has decided to replace some of their traditional way of 
performing certain operations such as site inspection with small commercial UAS 
capability, there are usually enthusiastic discussions around the benefits of capturing 
data and imagery with UAS capability, and the tremendous financial benefits that are 
attached to that for stakeholders. Occupational Health and Safety (OH&S) managers 
are also enthusiastic about utilizing small commercial UAS, realising considerable 
‘safety savings’, by not exposing their personnel to; working on ropes, scaffolding, 
at heights or in dangerous, potentially toxic or combustible environments.
However, there is a significant truism that must be raised—people love gadgets—
especially gadgets that are innovative, fun and novel, and especially in industries 
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that are technical in nature such as the HROs. There is a novelty factor with the 
introduction of a commercial UAS into an operation, and this factor has been an 
influence in more than one commercial drone mishap6.
Introducing a small UAS into an inspection operation can entice curiosity, 
unintentional (and intentional) non-compliance, excitement and distraction. There 
is also a misconception that safety risks are extremely low or eliminated by using 
a UAS. However, this potentially introduces new latent risk producing conditions 
within the operation, particularly in unfamiliar areas. The danger with these latent 
conditions is twofold. The potential hazards are hidden within the systems, and the 
UAS crew and other company safety personnel are also in direct contact with the 
operation. Integration of the roles and responsibilities of UAS crew with the host 
team and establishment of how they will work together is a key enabler of UAS 
safety culture. This highlights the importance of practising non-technical skills in 
UAS operation such as effective communication.
Communication is one of the complex factors that affect safety at the crew level 
and the organisational level for both the UAS crew and the host organisation in HROs. 
Communication modes in UAS also utilise many and varied mediums including 
verbal, digital, and visual modes. Often verbal communication is augmented by digital 
channels such as Data-link (Ashdown & Cummings, 2007), VHF communication 
radio, walkie talkies, mobile phones, and Wi-Fi communications via laptop computers.
Effective communication has a significant impact on how safety culture, policy, 
procedures and checklists are executed. Effective communication is the essential social 
element on which a positive safety culture is established and sustained. Effective 
communication not only facilitates an effective team culture but enables the tone 
of the safety culture within complex systems. Research (e.g., Calhoun, 2006; Foltz, 
Martin, Cooke, Kiekel & Gorman, 2003) identified that it was fundamental to have a 
clear understanding of and to subsequently facilitate crew communication across all 
phases of a UAS flight for a generic safety culture to be established and maintained.
Communication challenges that are unique to UAS include crews that are 
geographically dispersed rather than co-located. According to Mouloua (2003), these 
challenges were primarily the results of time delay issues with satellite and data-link 
relays, lack of real-time feedback of control responses and interference or distortion 
of images and data. An awareness of the potential for errors in communications is 
essential when evaluating the potential risks in the UAS operation. A study conducted 
by Barshi and Farris (2013) based on analysis of more than 12,000 aviation incident 
reports from NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) revealed that over 
73% contained evidence of a problem in the transfer of information.
The commercial UAS crew and the host organisation will each have their unique 
method and style of communication, and there may also be differences in acronyms, 
terminologies and, often, very different phraseologies. What one phrase or acronym 
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means to the host organisation may have a very different meaning to the UAS 
crew; CRM can mean ‘Customer Relationship Management, or ‘Crew Resource 
Management, and these two are very different concepts. In addition, communication 
methods, contents and styles often vary according to the operational type and 
environmental considerations. Smaller teams tend to communicate directly with 
each other which is commonly described as ‘horizontal communication’, whereas 
organisations with a number of teams controlled by a hierarchical structure, such as in 
many HROs tend to follow more ‘vertical communication’ style. An example includes 
the hierarchical vertical communication structure of the front lines workers, up to 
the foreman, the site manager, director of Health, Safety and Environmental (HSE), 
then Vice President (VP) of HSE, with communication being formal, structured and 
not in ‘real time’, whereas UAS crew tend to communicate horizontally and directly, 
usually in ‘real time’ with headphones via direct LTG network (phone) connections. 
Often UAS crews are smaller in numbers and include the higher level operational 
crew, who operate within a utilitarian corporate structure.
Research has identified that the most effective teams in complex control 
environments will engage in ‘horizontal’ communication of their shared mental 
models of the situation to ensure task affectivity (e.g., Cooke et al., 2007; Waller, 
Gupta & Giambastista, 2004). Waller et al. (2004) found that the most effective 
communication was usually between teams operating on the same level, rather than 
from a higher or lower hierarchical level and this suggested that the commercial 
UAS crew and the host organisation must work together to achieve the shared 
mental model and safety values prior to working together in the HRO to achieve 
effective safety policy, culture and behaviours. Cooke et al. (2007) concurred that 
although each member might understandably be attuned to different aspects of the 
same event, particularly an event in a complex team environment, team members 
were encouraged to share this information in order for the system to be coordinated.
Commercial UAS teams must be supported and integrated within the host 
organisation’s culture, at both the top level (policy and procedures) and the same 
level of functional teams with which they will directly interact. This integration will 
facilitate effective communication that may support generative safety behaviours, 
especially when considering emergency response plans and roles in an emergency 
and unexpected situation.
The success of the emerging UAS industry will be determined by the willingness 
and ability of UAS crew and the end users to employ aviation safety philosophies, 
disciplines and the proven aviation safety culture model. The UAS industry needs more 
than a compliance philosophy to be successful (Lamb, 2017). A positive commitment 
to developing a UAS safety culture is paramount, and the core foundation of this 
is a widely accepted philosophy and framework of behaviours called Airmanship. 
The application of this type of safety culture to be adopted and integrated into the 
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commercial UAV industry will lead to creating a new generation of Airmanship for 
a new generation of aviation.
Airmanship: Where Did It Come From and Where Is It Going?
The aviation safety culture is founded on collective principles called ‘Airmanship’. 
Kern (1997) described airmanship as an uncompromising discipline developed 
through systematic skill acquisition and continuing proficiency. The International 
Civil Aviation Organisation defines ‘Airmanship’ as… “the consistent use of good 
judgement and well-developed knowledge, skills and attitudes to accomplish flight 
objectives” (ICAO, 2011, P. 1-1). The principles of airmanship are indoctrinated 
to the potential aviator from the moment they step through the door of their flight 
training organisation and continues through every step of every day of their career. 
Implementation of the principles of Airmanship has provided consistent positive 
safety outcomes for these industries and forms an integral part of their brand of 
safety culture.
The airmanship model consists of bedrock principles, five pillars of knowledge 
and capstone outcomes. The five pillars are (Kern, 1997):
• Know yourself;
• Know your aircraft (UAS in this chapter);
• Know your team;
• Know your environment; and,
• Know your risk
The above pillars of knowledge require good aviators to draw on multiple knowledge 
bases (Kern, 1997). For instance, every commercial aviation organisation has its 
own ‘brand’ of safety culture which defines their unique relationship with safety 
and what may differentiate them from other organisations. When experienced flight 
instructors and captains transfer to a new aviation organisation, indoctrinating them 
into that particular organisation’s ‘brand’ of safety culture and systems is of paramount 
importance and one of the essential ‘onboarding’ elements. This ‘onboarding’ or 
induction into an organisation’s safety culture is an essential component in the 
airmanship knowledge pillar of ‘knowing your team’.
Airmanship focuses on the conduct and attributes of the individual, their 
professionalism, skill, discipline, knowledge base and decision-making ability. This 
is an important concept to consider within the commercial UAS operation. However, 
while presented in the context of the individual, the principals of Airmanship can 
and should be applied to the greater team (i.e., all the crew involved in the UAS 
operation). This is of importance when it is considered that one of the key ingredients 
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to the success of a UAS operation is having clearly defined roles and responsibilities 
as part of an effective safety management system (ICAO, 2012).
Airmanship is applicable to every team member and the role played by everyone 
within the UAS team. The performance of each team member contributes to the 
total system performance at any given part of the operation. For instance, when 
the UAS team leaders (e.g., remote pilot in command and managers) apply the 
principles of airmanship at the micro level (e.g., pre-flight task analysis, flight and 
task planning) right through to product delivery, the collective result achieves higher 
safety standards, greater efficiency and value in the end products (i.e., deliverables).
The level of professionalism of the UAS operator is often reflected in the 
deliverables. Deliverables are usually in a form of data such as images, measurements, 
items, frequency counts, or other detectable and quantifiable objectives. High quality 
and efficient service delivery include; safe execution of the operation, accurate data 
acquisition, processing, and storage. In many cases, interpretation and presentation 
of those data into relevance and ‘value’ to the end user is all a by-product of the level 
of professionalism of the UAS operator. The practice of airmanship principals, by 
each member of a UAS, will yield tangible benefits in customer satisfaction, safety 
and the long-term sustainability and reliability of UAS enabled services.
Dedicated Roles and the UAS Operation
Wickens (2007) described commercial UAS operations in HROs as a complex 
system requiring operators to be responsible for multiple tasks. Understandably, a 
UAS operator involved in a large commercial UAS operation has their role divided 
between navigation, flight control, communication, system monitoring, target or 
defect inspection, and mission management. On the other hand, in the case of the 
smaller commercial UAS operation conducting, for instance, inspection tasks in a 
complex environment, a UAS team may consist of only one or two crew members, 
giving a false impression that they are ‘self-contained’ or ‘self-sufficient’. The 
host organisation may have the impression that providing the UAS team with the 
‘standard contractor’ briefing before leaving them to work is an adequate safety 
procedure. However, research (e.g., van Breda, 1995) has shown that assigning all 
tasks to a single operator has been found to substantially degrade the operator’s 
performance. Therefore, it is important to integrate and involve the UAS crew into 
the organisation’s safety and operational team so that all crew have designated roles 
and a shared mental model of the operation, including what to do in the event of an 
emergency or ‘non- normal’ situation. To highlight the dangers of not providing the 
environment for UAS crew to interact with other onsite crew, consider the following 
real examples;
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Example 1: During an operational safety audit of a commercial UAS HRO, it was 
found that the flight task had to be abruptly aborted due to an immediate 
safety issue. The flight activity of the contracted commercial UAS crew had 
not been communicated, nor had any action been taken to integrate the UAS 
operation or its crew into the host organisation’s site. The incident caused a 
major distraction to the host organisation’s work area and created the potential 
for several serious accidents. While no injuries or damage occurred, the cost 
was incurred due to supply interruption, lost productivity, potential OH&S 
injuries, and delay in data collection and processing all of which represented 
two weeks of lost revenue for the host organisation.
Example 2: During an operational safety audit of a commercial UAS operation, on 
behalf of the host organization, it was found that during one of the flight tasks, 
one of the site workers accidentally ‘ran over’ part of the UAS equipment. The 
driver of the vehicle was unaware of the parameters of the operational (launch 
and recovery) area of the UAS crew and was distracted by the UAS activity. 
The damage to the equipment was substantial and had to be replaced. This 
also meant that the UAS surveillance activity had to cease until new equipment 
was acquired.
There are a number of procedures involved in commercial UAS operations. One 
of them is a ‘hand over’, also known as a ‘transfer of control’ which is described 
as the role and responsibilities of one crew member (the remote pilot(s)or members 
of the UAS team) are transferred to another remote pilot(s) or UAS crew members. 
Such a procedure is a deceptively complex task that may occur at the change of shift 
during the flight or ground operations. These handovers can be a time of increased 
exposure to risks, especially those risks associated with system mode errors and 
coordination breakdowns. Hobbs and Lyall (2016) found that there had been cases of 
inadvertent transfer of control between remote pilot control stations, due to controls 
set in error. One of the most cited cases that highlight crew co-ordination factors that 
lead to a mishap is the crash of the United States Department of Defence, Predator 
B aircraft in Nogales. The causal factors cited in the accident were; human factors, 
organizational failures, system design and integration (Carrigan, 2008).
Safety in UAS can only be attained if defined and specialised roles are developed 
with specific training procedures and philosophies, including precision system-based 
processes for crew changes and shift handovers (AAIF, 2011). Successful UAS crews 
appear to be evolving to embrace traditional safety procedures and practices that have 
proven efficient and increased safety in aviation, medicine and other safety-critical 
operations handovers. The use of precise and appropriate checklists, methodical 
preparation of both human and material assets is now identified as critical to reduce 
errors. The power of scenario-based training (simulation) has also proven to reduce 
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handover error in many industries (Flynn, 2008) and UAS operations will yield the 
same safety benefits if quality scenario-based training is employed.
CONCLUSION
As we drive towards harmonious integration of UAS into both our lower and upper 
airspace, we face a considerable number of new challenges. Of these challenges, 
human performance and human systems integration pose the greatest threats to 
seamless integration. Not surprisingly, the closer to earth (especially below 400ft 
above ground level), the more challenges arise for UAS integration, the complexities 
of package delivery, urban mobility and a new Unmanned Traffic Management System 
(UTM) and these provide not only logistical challenges but safety, certification and 
training challenges. To achieve this harmonious integration of man, machine, air 
traffic systems and commercial industry, we must begin at the foundational level, 
the human operator.
The interaction between human roles and responsibilities, between the technology 
components, the software, the platforms, and the UTM must be interoperable and 
harmonised if the system is to be safe and effective. Consider that this is not only at 
the local area but on a global scale. Achieving this harmonisation will be reliant on 
the strength of a robust, appropriate safety culture, applied airmanship principles, 
training, education and certification. Humans will remain the key component to the 
success of unmanned aviation even as the automation levels continue to increase 
towards the highest levels of automation, and arguably higher into the levels of 
non-deterministic system intelligence (autonomy].
Integrating a commercial drone operation into an existing organisation’s safety 
management system and safety culture can provide many challenges on various 
operational levels. There are human factors challenges, policy and procedural 
challenges, logistical challenges, possibly financial challenges and the challenge 
of managing change and expectations. To successfully cope with these challenges 
and integrate drones into your organisation, the solution may be found by starting 
at the individual level, educating and cultivating the Airmanship principles. This 
may also have the added benefits of impowering individuals to assist in building 
the new safety culture.
It is important to understand that safety culture exists in some form or another 
in any given organisation. For instance, it could be reactive, proactive, punitive, 
generative, bureaucratic, and predictive. Even the lack of an organised safety culture 
indicates the organisations’ relationship with safety, and usually, it is the key personnel 
who are responsible for implementing and cultivating the safety behaviours and 
attitudes of the organization.
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Safety cultures can and do evolve unintentionally, usually as a result of drifting 
away from a disciplined approach to safety, towards the easier, cheaper or faster way 
of operating. Unintentional safety cultures are usually the by-product of some of the 
following factors; misalignment of senior management with safety protocols, lack of 
appropriately qualified safety leader, missing safety oversight and or accountability, 
deficient regulatory framework, a ‘blame culture’, lack of education, lack of resources, 
lack of safety information sharing (and much more).
Many of the aforementioned factors are contributing to the industry culture that is 
being experienced now, especially in the small commercial UAS industry, operators 
are protective about disclosing the nature of their mishaps, safety data, contributing 
factors, and any corrective measures implemented in a highly competitive industry 
are often viewed as a competitive edge. This is a very different culture to that of 
manned aviation. Therefore, we must accept this difference and work with these 
concerns and challenges to unite the industry under common safety interests. With 
many countries still grappling with UAS legislation, some small commercial UAS 
operators have little professional industry support or guidance, unlike the traditional 
aviation community or model aircraft culture. This is a time where regulators and 
industries in all countries can and must work together to find the solutions to safety 
challenges.
The success of the emerging commercial UAS industry will be determined by 
the willingness and ability of organisations to adopt not only conventional aviation 
safety philosophies and disciplines but work together to develop a specific UAS 
safety philosophy, supported by Safety Management System (SMS) and Quality 
Management System (QMS) principals, cultivate UAS safety Culture at the individual 
level. This UAS safety philosophy will be successful if it embraces and supports 
the unique challenges of integrating professional UAS crews and their equipment 
into our national airspace, society and operational environments.
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ENDNOTES
1  Pilots refer to this as ‘Hangar talk’.
2  The C2 link is defined as the communications, command and control link 
to the remotely piloted aircraft. It is usually the only direct link between the 
remote pilot’s ability to control the aircraft. The C2 link is able to be provided 
for via several mediums; satellite, WIFI, telecommunications networks.
3  ICAO RPAS Concept of OperationS (CONOPS) (March 2017), page 5.
4  ICAO RPAS CONOPS (March 2017) page 22.
5  ICAO RPAS CONOPS (March 2017) page 19.
6  During 3 years as an ISO accredited QMS and Safety auditor, 3 separate 
incident reports indicated that distraction of workers due to ‘watching’ a UAS 
conduct its mission, occurred. One incident resulted in a vehicle colliding with 
the UAS crew launch equipment. 2014-2016 Australia.
